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I. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Review of the implementation of the one-trial system in 
Essex and Hampden counties during the five-month period July 
through November, 1987, provides the bases for the following 
conclusions: 
1, No major case flow problems appear to have occurred 
during this period as a result of the nev one-trial system. 
Introduction of the one-trial system appears to have had no 
major negative impact on District Court criminal case flow in 
either the primary courts or the jury sessions in Essex or 
Hampden Counties. A noticeable increase in jury trial requests 
has occurred in Hampden County, but the cause of this increase 
has been identified and its remedy appears attainable without 
the requirement of any change in the new procedural system. 
This transitional increase has not resulted in any significant 
case flow delay or backlog accumulation. 
2. The benefits of the one-trial system have been 
obtained without the emergence of any major issues regarding the 
legality or practicality of the one-trial procedural system. 
None of the many specific procedural elements built into 
the one-trial procedure (for example those involving discovery, 
admissions to sufficient facts, pleas of guilty, pretrial 
motions, claims for jury trial, and transfer of cases to the 
jury sessions) has been shown to be unworkable, either in terms 
of unfairness to defendants or impracticality in case scheduling 
and disposition. 
3. The shift to a one-trial system has not resulted in 
any significant new costs as yet, 
No new costs associated with staff, equipment, supplies or 
any other requirement have as yet resulted from the 
implementation of the one-trial system, at least with regard to 
the district courts involved, except that there continue to be 
clerical and session clerk staffing needs among the affected 
jury sessions. However, these needs preexisted the 
implementation of the one-trial system and would exist 
independent of the change. 
4 ,  A few specific issues have been identified regarding 
further improvement in the implementation of the one-trial 
system. These issues provide the opportunity to "fine tune" the 
one-trial procedure to further enhance its effectiveness. 
The issues identified appear to call for enhanced education 
and information. There appears to be no need for any change 
either in the statute or rules setting out the one-trial 
procedure. 
11. INTRODUCTION 
On November 18, 1986, the Governor signed into law a bill 
with major implications for the improvement of the 
administration of justice in the District Court of 
Massachusetts. That bill, St. 1986, c. 537, terminated the so- 
called "de novol1 or two-trial system for District Court criminal 
cases in Essex and Hampden Counties, and replaced it with a 
system providing each defendant with the opportunity for a 
single trial, with or without a jury, at the defendant's option. 
The bill had an effective date of July 1, 1987, and will 
continue in effect until June 30, 1989. During this two-year 
period, the fairness and effectiveness of the new procedures are 
to be monitored. Based on that review, at the end of the two- 
year period procedures will either revert to the old de novo 
system, or the new one-trial system will be continued in Essex 
and Hampden Counties and presumably will be considered for 
broader implementation. 
The statute requires several reports to be made by the 
Chief Justice of the District Court to the Legis1ature.l This 
is the first of those reports. 
In addition to providing required statistical analyses and 
cost statements, this report also provides a review of the 
initial implementation phase of the one-trial procedure in terms 
of the degree of difficulty encountered by those obligated to 
operate under its new requirements. 
The initial phase of implementation of Ch. 537 has been 
remarkable only for the absence of significant difficulties in 
the transition. Given the magnitude of the underlying change in 
terms of procedure and the volume of cases affected, it seemed 
reasonable to anticipate at least some degree of difficulty in 
the initial months of implementation. However, it appears clear 
that the shift to a one-trial procedure for District Court 
criminal cases in Essex and Hampden Counties has been 
accomplished without major case flow disruption or procedural 
confusion and with no jeopardy to defendantst rights. 
While the statistics analyzed in this report reveal no 
dramatic impact on District Court case flow during the initial 
months of implementation, a conclusive determination of the 
overall affect on case flow will not be possible until the next 
report, due on or before January 1, 1989. 
l ~ e e  St. 1986, c. 537, s. 28, set forth at Appendix A .  
This report is based on statistical data gathered by the 
District Court Administrative office2 and by discussions and 
interviews with judges, defense counsel and prosecutors 
operating under the new system. Formal comments were invited 
from the District Attorneys and the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, especially regarding any concerns they had regarding 
the experience to date under the one trial system. Formal 
comment has been received from Hampden County District Attorney 
Matthew J. Ryan, Jr. He indicated his support for the new 
system and its functioning thus far. However, he voiced concern 
regarding the increase in volume of jury requests in that county 
and the effect of a pre-existing policy involving local 
prosecution by town and city prosecutors in Hampden County. 
Both of these issues are addressed in Section IV of this report. 
Regarding the statistics relied on in the report, it should 
be mentioned that all of the conclusions reached are supported 
by the statistics set forth, and those statistics are considered 
generally valid and reliable. However, the lack of any 
computerized data system in the District Court requires that all 
case data be accumulated and tabulated manually. Given the hugh 
volume of cases involved, this process can jeopardize accuracy 
and completeness. In Essex County, assistance in analyzing the 
accumulated data was provided by the office of the Essex County 
District Attorney. Case disposition data and disposition time 
requirements were analyzed by use of the computer systems 
available at that office and on the basis of a 10% sampling 
technique. The tabulation and analysis of the data from Hampden 
County was accomplished entirely by a manual process. 
111. IMPACT OF THE NEW SYSTEM 
A. Case flow - Jury Trial Requests 
Perhaps the single greatest concern regarding the shift 
from a two-trial to a one-trial system was that every defendant, 
when faced with the choice between a single, final bench trial 
2 ~ h e  required filing deadline for this report of January 1, 
1988, prohibited the gathering and analysis of statistics 
through the month of December, 1987. Therefore the statistics 
reflected here and throughout this report are for the five-month 
period July through November, 1987. 
The only exception is the analysis of jury requests in 
Section I1 A of the report. This is based on quarterly reports 
and thus covers only July through September under the new 
system. 
or a single, final jury trial, would opt for the latter. The 
inevitable result would be that virtually all cases would pass 
through the local, or "primary", courts and accumulate at the 
regionally located jury sessions, resulting in large caseloads 
at the jury sessions and resulting delay. 
The counter argument was that the presumed indispensible 
ftscreeninglt function of the de novo system is largely a myth. 
Nationwide (including here in the Commonwealth) criminal courts 
operating without the benefit of a de novo system dispose of no 
fewer than 90% of their cases pretrial, that is, without anv 
trial, let alone a jury trial. Furthermore, it was argued that 
a proper system could be enacted allowing defendants to attempt 
to obtain an acceptable disposition at the local court in the 
context of a plea of guilty or an admission to sufficient facts, 
with no jeopardy to their right to claim a jury trial. Such a 
system, along with the availability of a final bench trial at 
the primary court, would ensure that the majority of cases were 
disposed of at the primary courts rather than passing through to 
the jury sessions. 
Operation under the new one-trial system has not resulted 
in a massive increase of jury trial claims. The large majority 
of case dispositions continue to occur at the local level. 
As set forth below in Table 1 (see Appendix B), the volume 
of cases claimed for jury trial in the Essex County jury 
sessions did not change dramatically with the advent of the new 
pr~cedure.~ The volume of cases coming into these jury sessions 
during the third quarter of 1987 (the first three months under 
the new system) rose only 6% over the previous quarter. This 
does not represent a significant shift, particularly in 
3~ full analysis of the need for and feasibility of 
abandonment of the de novo system in favor of a one-trial system 
in the Massachusetts District Court, is set forth in Elimination 
of the Trial De Novo System in Criminal Cases, Report of the 
Committee on Juries of Six to the Chief Justice of the District 
Court Department (January, 1984) (hereinafter, "De Novo 
Elimination Re~ort"). 
4~ote that this quarterly volume of jury requests includes 
cases covered by the new and old systems. That is, at least 
some of the jury requests made during the third quarter involve 
cases entered before July 1, 1987, the date the new system 
began. However, this does not affect the meaning of the data: 
If jury requests, in fact, were to have risen dramatically under 
the new system, that rise would be reflected in the third 
quarter statistics. 
comparison with previous quarterly increases that have occurred 
over the past two years under the de novo system. For example, 
in the third quarters of 1985 and 1986 there occurred increases 
of 20% and 1% respectively under the old de novo system.* 
Moreover, the volume of jury requests during the third quarter 
is considerably below the volume experienced during four of the 
five previous quarters under the old de novo system. Thus, 
relative to the long term trend under the de novo system, the 
volume of jury requests under the new system actually represents 
a reduction. 
In Hampden County there has occurred a large increase in 
the number of cases coming into the jury session: a 62% 
increase during the third quarter of 1987 compared with the 
second quarter. However, as explained below in Section IV, the 
cause of this increase has been identified, would appear to be 
easily addressed, and has not resulted in jury session backlog. 
Indeed, as of the second week of December, jury cases were being 
scheduled for trial in the second week in January. Also, this 
increase must be seen in perspective. While it represents a 62% 
increase over the previous quarter, the latter quarter had an 
unusually low volume. Compared to the average volume of the 
previous four quarters, the increase under the new system is 
only 22%. 
5 ~ t  should be noted that the inventories of pending cases 
in the jury sessions at the Salem District Court continue to 
warrant special attention, however. The inventory consisted of 
458 cases as of September 30, 1987, with 129, or 28%, over 120 
days old. An analysis of the gradual build up of this backlog 
indicates that its primary cause was the introduction of 
mandatory minimum sentences in drunk driving cases in late 1982 
and the subsequent wtougheningtl of drunk driving laws by means 
of the Safe Roads Act in late 1986. (It has been established 
that drunk driving cases now comprise more than half of all 
cases pending in the ~istrict Court jury sessions.) 
This problem has been addressed by the establishment of a 
jury session at the Peabody District Court, originally as a 
satellite of the Salem jury sessions, and later, as of July 1, 
1987, as a full-time, independent jury session, taking jury 
cases from the Peabody, Gloucester and Ipswich primary courts, 
all of which formerly went to the Salem jury sessions. As a 
result of this change, a gradual decrease in the Salem jury 
session backlog, and corresponding time to trial, has begun: 
Pending caseload at the end of June, 1987: 560; for the 
following months of July, August and September: 519, 431, 458, 
respectively. 
More important ,  t h e  t h i r d  q u a r t e r  inc rease  i n  Hampden 
County, l i k e  t h a t  i n  Essex County, is not  of s i g n i f i c a n t  
proport ion.  I f ,  i n  f a c t ,  t h e  implementation of t h e  o n e - t r i a l  
sys tem had r e s u l t e d  i n  wholesale jury  t r i a l  c la ims,  i n  
accordance wi th  some p red ic t ions ,  t h e  inc rease  i n  volume of 
cases  coming t o  t h e  jury sess ions  dur ing  t h e  t h i r d  q u a r t e r  would 
have been f a r  greater--with an o rde r  of magnitude of hundreds of 
percentage p o i n t s .  This  is because of t h e  high volume of cases  
i n  which ju ry  claims could be made. Ju ry  t r i a l  c laims p r i o r  t o  
adoption of t h e  new system h i s t o r i c a l l y  have occurred only  i n  3 
t o  4 %  of t o t a l  D i s t r i c t  Court cases .  Thus, t h e  inc rease  
experienced i n  Hampden County, while  impressive i n  abso lu te  
terms, r e p r e s e n t s  only a small  inc rease ,  perhaps only one o r  two 
percentage p o i n t s ,  i n  t h e  r a t e  of jury  claims a s  a percentage of 
t o t a l  f i l i n g s .  Analyzed i n  t h e s e  terms, t h e  Hampden County 
inc rease  means only t h a t  before  t h e  s h i f t  t o  a o n e - t r i a l  system 
approximately 97 i n  every 100 D i s t r i c t  Court defendants had 
t h e i r  cases  concluded i n  t h e  primary c o u r t ,  whereas i n  t h e  f i r s t  
t h r e e  months under t h e  o n e - t r i a l  system roughly 95 i n  every 100 
defendants  chose t o  do so.6 
Nor would it appear t o  be premature t o  put  t o  r e s t  t h e  
c r i t i c a l  ques t ion  of wholesale jury  claims. I f  i n  f a c t  most 
defendants  i n  a o n e - t r i a l  system would be i n e v i t a b l y  compelled 
t o  pass  through t h e  primary c o u r t ,  r a t h e r  than  t o  r eques t  and 
rece ive  a f i n a l  t r i a l  o r  p r e t r i a l  d i s p o s i t i o n  t h e r e ,  it is f a i r  
t o  assume t h a t  t h i s  phenomenon would have emerged during t h e  
f i r s t  t h r e e  months. I t  would appear h igh ly  un l ike ly  t h a t  a f t e r  
one q u a r t e r  without such an e f f e c t ,  t h e  r a t e  of jury  t r i a l  
claims would subsequently undergo a r a p i d  increase .  I n  any 
event ,  monitoring of t h e  i s s u e  w i l l  cont inue ,  and t h e  next  
r e p o r t  on t h e  new system due on o r  be fo re  January 1, 1989, w i l l  
address  t h e  ques t ion  again.. 
B. Case flow - Primary Court Dispos i t ions .  
A c o r o l l a r y  t o  t h e  concern f o r  a huge "pass throught1 of 
cases  t o  t h e  ju ry  sess ions ,  has  been a concern t h a t  somehow, 
even i f  most c a s e s  were resolved a t  t h e  l o c a l  o r  primary c o u r t s ,  
t h e  new system might s e r i o u s l y  bog down t h a t  process.  On t h i s  
i s sue ,  t h e  f e a r  apparent ly has stemmed from a b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  de  
novo system no t  only is e f f i c i e n t  i n  "screening ou tn  cases ,  i . e .  
d ispos ing  of them l o c a l l y  without t h e  need f o r  a jury  t r i a l  
claim, bu t  a l s o  t h a t  t h e  de novo system ensures  t h a t  t h e s e  
d i s p o s i t i o n s  a r e  achieved quickly.  According t o  t h i s  th ink ing ,  
6 ~ x a c t  d a t a  regarding t h e  r a t e  of ju ry  t r i a l  c laims under 
t h e  new system, i .e .  t h e  number of such claims a s  a percentage 
of t o t a l  f i l i n g s ,  a r e  unavai lab le  f o r  Hampden County. 
even if a significant number of cases are disposed of locally 
under a one-trial system, there may be great delay in achieving 
those dispositions. This delay may occur because under a one- 
trial system, a judge's decisions and rulings are subject to 
appellate review. Thus, pretrial motion practice would become 
more rigorous. Moreover, the initial bench trial in the de novo 
system, generally a relatively informal affair, would no longer 
be available to serve as a discovery device for those defendants 
who, depending on the outcome, might want to void the primary 
court trial and sentence and get a new trial in the jury 
session. Under the one-trial system, discovery would have to be 
sought in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, and 
this would be awkward and time-consuming. 
However, a statistical review of case dispositions under 
the new system during the first five months of its operation 
does not reveal any particular grounds for concern at this time. 
These statistics, more fully set forth in Tables 2 and 3 
(Appendices C and Dl respectively), show that in Essex County, 
92.7% of all cases disposed of at the primary courts under the 
new system were disposed of with finality, 88% by pretrial 
disposition, i.e. either by means of an admission or plea, or as 
a result of a pretrial motion, and 4.7% by means of a bench 
trial. And these disposition did not entail any delay: the 
average time from entry to pretrial disposition (the vast 
majority of cases) was 26 days, and from entry to bench trial 
was 67 days. 
In Hampden County, 94% of all disposition occurred at the 
primary court, 91.9% by pretrial disposition and 2.1% by bench 
trial. Similarly, these dispositions were prompt: the average 
time from entry to pretrial disposition was 37 days, and from 
entry to bench trial 58 days. 
In terms of volume, the primary courts in Essex County had, 
by November 30, disposed of 38% of all cases entered since July 
1. The primary courts in Hampden had disposed of 21%. The 
entry dates of the cases entered under the new system are not 
known. Therefore, the average age of the undisposed pending 
caseloads under the new system in each county as of November 30 
cannot be determined. However, presuming a random distribution 
of entry dates, the average age of the pending caseload after 
five months would be two and one-half months, or 75 days. , The 
actual average age of the pending cases is likely to be less 
than this, since the entry dates of the cases still pending as 
of November 30 would tend to be later in the five month period 
than the entry dates of the cases already disposed. 
In any event, it would appear that the new system has not 
negatively affected the promptness of dispositions in the 
primary courts. And neither the rate of primary court 
disposition under the new system (38% in Essex County and 21% in 
Hampden County as of November 30) , nor the average age of the 
undisposed cases in the primary courts in both counties (almost 
75 days, and probably less, as of November 30) , are cause for 
concern at this time. It must be kept in mind that the majority 
of cases disposed during the first five months of the new system 
were cases still governed by the old de novo procedure, that is, 
cases that had been entered before July 1, 1987. Only when 
these old cases have been eliminated will a more definitive 
picture of the impact of the new system be possible. 
C. Case flow - Jury Session Dispositions 
The manner of disposition of cases that have gone to the 
jury sessions under the new system is not entirely clear. This 
is because, as explained in note 5, Table 2, the sample of Essex 
County dispositions under the new system does not contain a 
subset of cases claimed for jury trial that is sufficiently 
large to provide statistically valid conclusions regarding the 
manner of jury session disposition. In other words, while the 
number of jury claims indicated in the sample validly represents 
the actual number of total jury claims made under the new 
system, so few were contained in the sample that no 
statistically valid conclusions can be drawn regarding the 
manner of their jury session disposition--pretrial, bench trial 
or jury trial. The statistical collection system in Essex 
County will be redesigned to accommodate this need, and the 
matter addressed in future reports. 
However, the figures for Hampden County are instructive. 
There, all cases entered and disposed of under the new system 
were counted, rather than a sample. As shown in Table 3, 
(Appendix D), of the total of 2,174 cases disposed of under the 
new system during the period July 1 through November 30, only 
127 such cases were disposed of in the jury session (6%). Of 
these, 98 (77%) were disposed of pretrial, 16 (13%) by bench 
trial and 13 (10%) by jury trial. 
One point should be recognized regarding jury session 
dispositions under the new system. While the volume of cases 
going to the jury sessions under the new system is critical to 
the feasibility of that system, analysis of the dispositions of 
these cases once they arrive would not appear to be of major 
significance because there would appear to be no aspect of the 
new system that would affect the manner of disposition of jury 
session cases. Whether a case arrives at a jury session under 
the de novo system or under the one-trial system would appear to 
be essentially irrelevant to whether the defendant, having 
arrived there, then chooses to conclude the case by pretrial 
disposition, bench trial, or jury trial. 
In any event, the statistics gathering process for the next 
report due on or before January 1, 1989 will provide sufficient 
data to test this hypothesis, and, if the new system is shown to 
have had an effect on these variables, to determine the scope 
and significance, if any, of that effect. 
D. Qualitative Improvements 
The fundamental goal in eliminating trial de novo is to 
improve the quality of District Court criminal procedure. In 
fact, it was recognized that while elimination of the de novo 
system might help produce some particular time savings, overall 
the shift to a one-trial system would produce a net increase in 
the demand for District Court judge time.8 Thus, the central 
question was, Itcan the overall increased time demands of a one- 
trial system be accommodated with present judicial resources?I1 
The qualitative improvements in the administration of justice 
can be obtained only if the time demands could be absorbed. 
As indicated above, the shift to a one-trial system does 
not appear to have had a significant impact on District Court 
case flow either in terms of case disposition at the primary 
courts, or in terms of the volume of jury trial claims. 
Moreover, some evidence of the qualitative improvements at the 
heart of the reform can be observed. 
The wvoidablell bench trial, which is immune from appellate 
review, has been eliminated. District Court defense attorneys 
and prosecutors alike appear to have begun to develop a 
meaningful pretrial motion practice. Under the new system, such 
motions not only can be dispositive, but the court's rulings on 
them are subject to appellate review. In contrast, rulings on 
pretrial motions in the primary courts under the de novo system 
are not reviewable nor are they of any significance if the case 
goes to a jury session. Under the de novo system, all rulings 
on motions, as well as all trial results and sentences, are 
rendered null and void at the defendant's option. 
The use of the voidable bench trial merely as a discovery 
device has also terminated. The entire well-developed body of 
law and procedural rules by which discovery is both ensured and 
regulated--essentially meaningless in primary courts under the 
7 ~ e e  De Novo Elimination Report, pp. 22-26. 
8 ~ e e  De Novo Elimination Report, pp. 41-56. 
old de novo system--is now in effect. The salutary aspects of 
this change have been achieved without incurring burdensome 
delay, as indicated by the previous discussion of case flow 
under the new system. This appears to be true because, in a 
majority of cases, the discoverable material required by the 
defense in order to make a responsible decision regarding 
pretrial disposition is available from the prosecution as a 
matter of course. Where pretrial disposition is not possible, 
the rules provide a clear basis for resolving any issues 
regarding discovery that may arise. 
Another qualitative benefit resulting from the adoption of 
the one-trial system in Essex and Hampden counties is the 
reduction in repeated court appearances by victims and 
witnesses. Though the frequency of such appearances and the 
reduction of this frequency over the past five months cannot be 
easily quantified, it can be said that many of the cases that 
have been disposed of under the new system by means of a 
pretrial plea or admission would, under the de novo system, have 
required a bench trial. In each of these instances, victims and 
witnesses who would have been required to appear have been 
relieved of that duty with no jeopardy to the rights of the 
defendants involved. In addition, because the possibility of 
double trials has been eliminated, the cases that have been 
tried in the jurv session (with or without a jury) have required 
only one appearance by victims and witnesses, whereas in many if 
not most of these cases the victim and witnesses would have been 
required to attend an initial bench trial had the de novo system 
been in effect. 
Similarly unmeasurable and subtle, but nonetheless 
important, are the other qualitative benefits inherent in the 
one-trial system that accompanied the implementation of that 
system. These benefits and advantages include the impact on 
sentencing and the public perception of ju~tice.~ 
The improvements in the system have not come at the expense 
of defendant's rights. We are aware of no instances as yet in 
which any aspect of the new procedures has been the subject of 
appellate challenge in any appellate court, let alone any 
successful challenge. Nor are we aware of any aspect of the new 
procedures that has been invalidated as a matter of trial court 
interpretation or ruling. 
'~hese and other benefits of moving from the de novo system 
to the one-trial system are discussed in the De Novo Elimination 
Report, pp. 21-26. 
E. Costs. 
No costs as yet have been incurred in the implementation of 
the one-trial system in terms of personnel, equipment, supplies 
or other cost item. The sole, minor exception to the conclusion 
is the sum, less than $1,000, expended for the printing of 
revised transfer forms by which cases are transmitted from the 
primary courts to the jury sessions. 
One resource that has been strained by the new system, 
however, is certain clerical and session-clerk personnel in the 
jury sessions in both Essex and Hampden Counties. However, it 
must be noted that these shortcomings were evident before the 
implementation of the new system and appear not to have been 
caused by it. And while the case flow to the jury sessions, as 
has been discussed, has not been significantly increased under 
the new system in terms of the sessions' ability to avoid delays 
in dispositions, the incremental increase in paperwork has 
exacerbated the pre-existing personnel shortages. These 
shortages will have to be addressed regardless of whether the 
new system is continued beyond the experimental period. 
It can be argued, though not clearly documented, that an 
actual cost savings has been achieved under the one-trial 
system. This conclusion proceeds from the fact that the 
majority of primary court bench trials under the de novo system 
require the presence and testimony of the arresting or citing 
officer. The elimination of this procedure and its replacement 
with a formal guilty plea or admission procedure requiring, in 
most cases, only a recitation of facts from the police report, 
should translate into a marked decrease of police time spent in 
court. However, this has not been documented at this time. 
IV. ISSUES IDENTIFIED 
Based primarily on observations of the new system in 
operation and on informal discussions with participants, several 
important issues have been identified regarding the initial 
stage of implementation on the one-trial system. Each of these 
issues presents the opportunity to further improve the 
effective implementation of the new system and warrant careful 
monitoring. 
A. The Cause of Many Jury Requests 
The first and most important issue involves jury requests. 
It appears that in Hampden County especially, a number of 
defense counsel do not employ procedures available under the new 
system for obtaining a prompt and acceptable pretrial 
disposition in the primary court with no jeopardy to the 
defendant's right to claim a jury trial. Under this procedure 
the defendant, through counsel, can submit a dispositional 
request to the judge in the primary court. This request need 
not be agreed upon by the prosecution. Under the law and 
applicable rules of court, the request is tendered in the 
context of an admission or plea of guilty with all attendant 
safeguards to assure that it is knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for the 
charge. If the court rejects the requested disposition, the 
defendant is free to withdraw the admission or plea and demand a 
trial, by jury if preferred. In rejecting the request, the 
judge may indicate the disposition that would be acceptable to 
the court, in which case the defendant can decide whether to 
maintain the plea or admission with that sentence resulting, or, 
in effect, reject that sentence and claim a trial. 
Of course, no defendant is required to engage in this 
procedure. Following pretrial conference, each defendant is 
free merely to demand a trial at the outset and put the 
Commonwealth to its proof. However, the reality is that in all 
criminal court systems nationwide, the great majority of 
defendants do, in fact, "plead out," i.e. admit to sufficient 
facts or plead guilty in return for a disposition acceptable to 
the court and to the defendant. The prosecution either 
recommends or offers no opposition to most of these 
dispositions. 
The increase in jury claims in Hampden County appears in 
large part to result from the lack of use of this procedure by 
defense counsel. As shown in Table 3 (Appendix D), of the 127 
cases that went to the Hampden County jury session under the 
new system between July 1 and November 30 and were disposed of 
there, 98 (77%) were disposed of pretrial. These dispositions, 
with very few exceptions, were on admissions or pleas. (Only 13 
(10%) were tried by jury; 16 (13%) received bench trials.) More 
important, it appears that the majority of pretrial dispositions 
obtained in the jury session were probably not significantly 
different from the dispositions that would have been received 
had those same dispositions been requested at the primary court. 
Again, if the desired disposition had been requested at the 
primary court but rejected, the defendant would have been free 
to withdraw the admission or plea and go to the jury session and 
try again. 
Almost half of all jury requests coming into the 
Springfield jury session, which serves all of Hampden County, 
originate from the Springfield primary court. One tendency 
among some defense counsel in the Springfield primary court 
appears to be to claim jury trial soon after arraignment with no 
attempt to request a disposition. This may be fostered by the 
fact that such an approach simply "puts the matter offtf for two 
or three weeks, whereupon it will still be called in the 
Springfield court (albeit at the jury session), where the chance 
to plead or admit will again be available. Doubts about the new 
procedure and the fact that it in no way jeopardizes the 
defendant are resolved in favor of bypassing it. 
The occurrence of this approach is borne out by the 
statistics. Of the 56 cases flowing to the Springfield jury 
session from the Springfield primary court and disposed there 
under the new system from July 1 through November 30, 47 (84%) 
were disposed of pretrial. Presumably, many if not most of 
these cases could have been disposed of in the Springfield 
primary court, had the available procedure been exploited. 
In summary, at least a portion of the increased flow of 
cases to the jury sessions, especially in Hampden County, 
appears to result not from some inherent aspect of the system, 
but rather from the lack of use of a particular procedural 
component. In Hampden County, the majority of cases going to 
the jury session and disposed of there have been disposed of 
pretrial, virtually all by admission or plea: 84% of those from 
the Springfield primary court, 77% of the jury requests 
countywide. It is believed that further educational efforts 
with the bar will result in many if not most of these cases 
being resolved pretrial in the primary courts. 
B. Integration of the Primary and Jury Sessions. 
Since their statewide designation as a result of the Court 
Reorganization Act of 1978, the District Court jury sessions 
have been viewed as in some sense separate from the courts in 
which they function. This view seemed to result from the fact 
that jury trials were essentially foreign to the district 
courts. Because cases transferred to the jury sessions were, 
for the most part, I1appealedlt there under the de novo system, 
the jury- sessions became viewed as a separate lflevellt of the 
district courts, not an integrated part of the courts wherein 
they operate. This has led to some inefficiencies. For example, 
jury sessions tend to be located in the courts with the highest 
volume in each county. Thus, a great proportion of each jury 
session's business comes from the very court at which it sits. 
But, because of the "separate level" concept, an entirely new 
case file is seen as necessary, even when a case going to the 
jury session is really only going "down the hall." This 
separate level concept may also play a part in the tendency thus 
far for more cases than perhaps necessary to be transferred from 
the primary courts to the jury sessions under the new system, 
particularly in Hampden County. 
In any event, the introduction of the one-trial system has 
eliminated any conceptual grounds for the separate level 
perception. Under the new system, cases are not appealed to the 
jury session after a bench session trial. In each case where a 
trial is necessary, there is only one; the jury session merely 
provides a forum wherein jury trials are logistically possible. 
Each adjudication in the one-trial system is final and subject 
to appeal only on issues of law, regardless of whether it occurs 
at the bench session or a jury session. 
This shift in perception clarifies the need and the 
propriety of streamlining the paper flow between the primary 
courts and jury sessions--certainly where a case goes from a 
bench session to a jury session in the same court there is no 
need for a separate case file to be created. A study of this 
issue is now underway. The resulting improvements may well 
ameliorate the clerical staffing problems that have long beset 
the jury sessions. 
By eliminating the separate level concept, the one-trial 
system is producing a more important benefit. In a one-trial 
system there is no reason why a judge sitting in a primary court 
session cannot hear a pretrial motion, plea or admission in a 
case pending in the jury session at that same court (assuming 
that judge has not previously heard any evidence in the case). 
In other words, the one-trial system allows the maximum 
efficient use of judge-time, since cases cannot be viewed as 
having left one level of the system and gone to another. This 
office is currently exploring ways to take advantage of this 
flexibility, which should contribute to prompt dispositon of 
cases. 
C. Pretrial Conference Scheduling and Conduct. 
Another issue encountered during the initial months under 
the one-trial system involves the scheduling and conduct at the 
individual courts of the now-mandatory pretrial conferences. In 
several of the busier courts, the process followed was that 
cases scheduled for pretrial conference had to await the call of 
the list before being sent outIv for conference. This 
procedure has the disadvantage of causing all participants to 
wait through the call of the list before meeting to discuss 
pretrial matters, particularly the possibility of pretrial 
disposition, the method of disposition that will eventually 
obtain in the majority of cases. 
It would appear unnecessary, in theory at least, for cases 
to be called before being conferenced. Efforts are under way to 
change procedures to ensure to the extent possible that defense 
counsel conferences with the prosecution prior to the call of 
the list. In this way when the case is called the results of 
the conference can be reviewed by the court. Such an approach 
is possible only in a one-trial system. In a de novo system, a 
rigorous and truly productive pretrial conference system is not 
possible in so far as the all participants realize that the 
results of that conference, in terms of pretrial motions, a 
trial, or an admission, can be rendered pointless if the 
defendant chooses to appeal. It is believed that more progress 
can be made in promoting the more efficient scheduling and use 
of the pretrial conference as part of the one-trial system. 
D. Pretrial Motions. 
Some confusion has been observed regarding the requirements 
and options that exist under the one-trial system regarding the 
filing and hearing of pretrial motions. 
The statute and applicable rules of court insure each 
defendant the option of filing any pretrial motion in the 
primary court, or in the jury session, if in fact the case is 
transferred to the latter forum. If the defendant files any 
pretrial motion in the primary court, the court may hear and 
decide it as a matter of discretion, with the exception of 
discovery motions, which it must hear and decide. A ruling on a 
pretrial motion by a primary court is binding in any further 
proceedings in a jury session. A ruling on a pretrial motion by 
a judge in a primary court or a jury session is appealable on 
issues of law. Regarding discovery motions, no defendant can be 
compelled to make the decision on jury trial waiver (i.e. 
whether he or she wants to take the case from the primary court 
to a jury session) until the primary court has heard and decided 
any discovery motions that have been filed. Regarding all other 
pretrial motions, the primary judge can decline to hear such 
motions unless the defendant waives jury trial. 
Two issues have arisen under this scheme. First, there 
is some indication that primary court judges are reluctant to 
hear pretrial motions, even ones that are potentially 
dispositive, such as motions to dismiss and motions to suppress. 
This could be troublesome insofar as jury sessions become 
burdened unnecessarily with motions that could be heard in the 
primary courts, and cases that, based on those motions, could be 
disposed of in the primary courts. If this tendency indeed 
becomes problematic, one solution would be to authorize jury 
session judges to selectively I1remand1' such issues to the 
primary courts. However, it does not appear at this point that 
any remedial action is required. 
The second aspect of the pretrial motion procedure that 
warrants further monitoring involves discovery. There appear to 
be some instances wherein multi-page, form discovery requests 
are filed as pretrial motions, without any attempt by the 
defense simply to request the documents and information desired 
directly from the prosecution. Two problems result. There is 
unnecessary delay while the motion is set for hearing. If the 
information to which the defense unquestionably has a right 
(e.g. the police report) were obtained without motion, this 
could promptly provide sufficient information on which to base a 
disposition request. Also, such form motions may seek material 
or documents irrelevant or inapplicable to the case at issue, a 
fact that can and should be explored by the parties at the 
pretrial conference. 
This area of concern requires further monitoring at this 
time. No need for a change in procedures or rules is presented. 
E. Local Prosecution in Hampden County. 
As indicated in the Introduction to this report, the 
District Attorney of Hampden County has indicated his concern 
regarding the implementation of the one-trial system in the 
context of a pre-existing policy in Hampden County. Under that 
policy, many District Court criminal cases in the primary courts 
have been prosecuted by prosecutors employed by the various 
cities and towns. Under the old de novo system, the legal 
authority of these prosecutors, though questionable, has been 
moot in a practical sense. As with any alleged legal defect in 
a primary court proceeding under the old de novo system, the 
only remedy for any defendant wishing to challenge that 
authority was to claim appeal for a totally new trial. No 
potential legal defect could be addressed through appellate 
review under the de novo procedure. 
With the advent of the one-trial system, defendants are 
free to raise legal issues through the appellate process (one of 
the reform's basic qualitative improvements). And the District 
Attorney has indicated his desire to be responsible for all 
prosecutions. Thus the issue of local prosecution is no longer 
merely academic. The District Attorney's concern is that 
assuming the burden of all local District Court prosecution will 
require significant increases in the number of Assistant 
District Attorneys. 
The only response to this issue at this time would appear 
to be recognition of it and support of the necessary additions 
to the prosecutorial staff. If indeed the question of the 
validity of prosecution by local city and town prosecutor's 
receives appellate review as a result of the one-trial procedure 
and is answered in the negative, it would appear that the 
requirement for District Attorney prosecution would obtain 
whether the one-trial system is maintained or the system reverts 
to the old de novo procedure. In other words, if local 
prosecution is determined to be invalid, the need for District 
Attorney prosecutors in all cases would appear to be established 
regardless of the type of system ultimately employed. 
APPENDIX A 
St. 1986, c. 537, s. 28: 
SECTION 28. The administrative justice for the district 
court department of the trial court, in consultation with the 
district attorneys for Essex and Hampden counties and the 
committee for public counsel services, shall prepare and file 
with the clerks of the senate and house of representatives and 
the house committee on ways and means, an initial report on the 
implementation of this act, on or before January first, nineteen 
hundred and eighty-eight, an interim report on said 
implementation, on or before January first, nineteen hundred and 
eighty-nine, and a final report on said implementation, on or 
before January first, nineteen hundred and ninety. Said reports 
shall provide detailed information concerning the status and 
effect of implementation of this act, including but not limited 
to any costs incurred as a result of such implementation as well 
as a statistical analysis of the disposition of criminal 
prosecutions conducted pursuant to the provisions of this act 
which indicate for each district court the total number of cases 
entered, the number of cases disposed before trial, the number 
of cases tried by a jury of six, the number of cases tried by a 
court without a jury and the average time between entry and 
disposition of cases in each such category. 
APPENDIX B 
DISPOSIIIOIS UIDER OIE-TRIAL SYSTKM - ESSBX COUITY 
July through November, 1987 
IN PRIMARY COURT IN JURY SESSIONS 
CASES CASES 
ENTERED DISPOSED PRE- AVE. BENCH AVE . JURY PRE- AVE . BENCH AVE. JURY AVE . 
APTKP BY TRIAL TIME TRIAL TIME C L A I M S ~  TRIAL TIME TRIAL TIME TRIAL TIME 
s 1 3 0 1 e 7 ~  11130187 
KSSEX** I 
Amasbury 
Cloucastar 
Havarhlll 
Iprwich 
Lawranca 
LJM 
Nawburyport 
Paabody 
Salem 
NOT AVAILABLE' 
TOTAL 13,819 5,675 4,992 2 6 267 6 7 413 
'Tha numbars sat forth for (1) cases disposed as listed by type of disposition and (2) average times to disposition have been 
datarminad from a random sampla of 10% of a11 casas disposed. This rampla exceeds the minimum necessary for a statistically valid 
rasult, in accordanca with tha rulas of statistical analysis. 
2 ~ h a  discrapancy for the Amasbury District Court--340 casas entarad undar the new system and 377 disposed of--has not been 
rasolvad. It may rasult from a numbar of summar *baach arrasts* made prior to July 1, 1987 erroneously being counted as dispositions 
undar the new syqtams, whara tha dafendants war. not arraignad until aftar July 1. 
3 * ~ ~ a .  timer* ir tha avar.8. numbar of days from entry to each typa of disposition. The average time from entry to bench trial 
di8p08ition in tha Lynn District Court, 109 days, is distorted: tha sampling technique yielded only one case in this category and it 
had a tima span of 109 days from entry to disposition. Hence, the "avarage* of 109. 
"~ury claims* ara the number of casas which wera *disposed* in the primary court by claim of jury, regardless of whether these 
casar war. disposad of in the jury session. 
 ha 102 stmpla of casas disposed undar the naw systam, on which this analysis is based, yields a statistically inadequate 
n w b a r  of Jury r.ssion dispositions when brokan down by typa, 1.e. pretrial, banch trial, jury trial. Thus, for example, a 
datarmination that on. case from a sample of 100 was disposad of by jury trial during the period July 1 through November 30, 1987, 
doar not provida a valid basis for dotarmining that jury trials occurrad with the same frequency for the entire volume of 1,000 
dlrporitions. Saa discussion in Saction I11 C of text regarding tha significance of jury sassion dispositions by type. 
TABLE 3 
CASES 
ENTERED 
AFTER 
6130187 
ChLcopee 1,059 
Holyoke 1,394 
Palmer 1,005 
Springfield 5,448 
Westf ield 931 
TOTAL 9,837 
CASES 
DISPOSED 
BY 
11130187 
DISPOSITIOUS UUDER ORE-TRIAL SYSTEM - AAMPDEN COUNTY 
July through November, 1987 
DISPOSITIONS BY TYPE 
IN PRIMARY COURT IN JURY SESSION 
PRE - AVE . ' BENCH AVE. JURY PRE- AVE. BENCH AVE . JURY AVE . 
TRIAL TIME TRIAL TIME CLAIM& TRIAL TIME TRIAL T JME TRIAL TIUE 
'"Av~. time" is the average number of days from entry to each 
'"~ury claims" are the number of cares in which the defendant 
a subsequent jury sesslon disposition on or before November 30. 
type of dlrporltlon. 
in the primary court claimed a Jury trlal and In there was 
